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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TRE STATE OF UTAH
)

CARL BALDWIN and LARRY GLEIM, )
)

Plaintiffs end Appellants,)
)

vs.
VANTAGE CORPORATION, a Utah
corporation,

)
)
)
)

Civil No. 18202

)

Defendant and Respondent. )
)

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF CASE
This is an action brought by the Appellants to rescind
a contract for the purchase of seven (7) building lots from
the Respondent and to seek restitution of moneys paid by Appellants to Respondent for the purchase of fcur (4) of the
seven

(7)

building lots.

Respondent counterclaimed to fore-

close Appellants' interest in the said four (4) building
lots.

DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried in a District Court, sitting without
a jury, on October 30, 1981.

After the close of evidence,

the Court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law and Judgment against the Appellants and in favor of
Respondent.
A Motion to Amend the Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law and the entry of a new or different Judgment was made
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
1
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by Appellants on November 25, 1981.

The Court denjed said

Motion on December 30, 1981.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent respectfully requests this Court to affirm
the lower Court's decision.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Carl Baldwin and Larry Gleim, (hereinafter referred to
as the Appellante), were business partners engaged generally in the construction industry. (R.82).

The Respondent

Vantage Corporation, (hereinafter referred to as "Vantage"),
is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Deseret Federal Savings and
Loan Association, (hereinafter referred to as nDeseret
Federal'').

One of Vantage's business ventures was the de-

velopment of the "Blackhawk Subdivision" in Pleasant Grove,
Utah.

(R.184) .
Sometime i.n April of 1978, the Appellants met with an

employee of Vantage, Doug Boulton, at the offices of Deseret
Federal in Orem.

The Appellants were considering buying

some building lots at Blackhawk Subdivision.

At the first

meeting, some of the terms and conditionn under which lots
would be sold were discussed.

(R.83).

Later in April of 1978, the Appellants m€t two more
times with Doug Boulton.

These meetings took place at a

Deseret Federal branch in Salt L2ke City.

(R.86-88).

At

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the last meeting, the Appellants gave Vantage a check for
the· down payment on seven ( 7) lots at Blackhawk Subdivision.

Plaintiff'~

(R.88 and

Exhibit #1).

Although there

was testimony to the fact that an Earnest Money Agreement
may have been entered into by the parties, nc evidence of
tradition.al writings that are normally associated with the.
sale of land was presented to the Court.

(R.177).

Despite the apparent lack of existence of a traditional writing, most of the terms and conditions of the contract
to sell the seven (7) lots tc the Appellants are not in dispute.

(Brief of Appellant, p.4).

However, one item of the

contract to sell the seven (7) lots is disputed.

Appellants

allege that Vantage unconditionally "guaranteed" to Appellants that Deseret Federal would provide construction loans
to Appellants for the building of homes on the seven (7)
lots.

(R.86-87).

exists.

(R.79).

Vantage denies that such a condition
The Trial Court held that the Appellants

fail to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the
existence of such a guarantee.

(R.194-195).

Shortly after the Appellants and Vantage entered intc
the contract to purchase the seven (7) lots, the Appellants
went to Alaska for

su~~er.

Upon their return in the fall,

the Appellants noted that they had been receiving monthly
billings for interest on the
lots.

(R.89).

outstandi~g

principal on the

In January of 1979, Appellants gave a check

to Vantage for all unpaid interest.

(R.90 and Plaintiff's

Exhibit //2) .
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In June of 1979, the Appellants made another interest
payment to Vantage.

The payment was in the form of a check.

Enclosed with the check was a handwritten letter that read:
Bi.ACKHAWK ESTATES PLAT "D"
Interest for Lots:
18, 19, 28, 34, 35, 49, 58
This check for $2,990.32 should
pay us through May, 1979.
Thank you,
/s/ Carl B. Baldwin
Baldwin & Gleim Construction
(R.93, 174-175; Plaintiff's Exhibit /13, and Defendant's
Exhibit 117).
Sometiffie later in June of 1979, the Appellants sold two
(2) of the lots to Mr. Mark Stringham and paid Vantage all
the unpaid interest and principal attributed to those two
(2) lots.

Vantage passed titled for those lots to Mr.

Stringham.

Apparently the AppellBnts made a profit upon the

sale of this property.

(R.93-94, 116-117, and Defendant's

Exhibit 115).
In November of 1979, the Appellants sold one of the
five (5) remaining lots to a Mr. O'Bannon.

As with the

other sale, the Appellants paid Vantage all unpaid principel
and interest that was attributed to that lot and Vantage
passed the title to Mr. O'Bannon.
made a profit on the sale.

Again, the Appellants

(R.94, 117, and Defendant's

Exhibit /15).
In addition to the above-described three (3) lots sold
by the Appellants, they also entered into an agreement to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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sell a lot to Mr. Gary Mayo, a former employee of Deserct
Federal and neighbor to the Appellants.

Mr. Mayo paid to

the Appellants approximately the same amount of money that
the Appellants had paid to Vantage in interest and principal.

CR.112-113).
Two years after entering their contract to purchase the

seven

(7)

lots, the Appellants approached Ms. LaRae Pittman,

a loan officer at Deseret Federal's Orem office, about obtaining construction financing to build two speculation
homes on two of the lots.

Ms. Pittman informed the

Appellants that Deseret Federal was not making construction
loans on speculation homes at that time.

(R.96).

The Ap-

pellants stated to the loan officer that Vantage had
"guaranteed" construction financing from Deseret Federal.
The Appellants werE then referred to Mr. Preben Nielsen, an
officer of Vantage and Deseret Federal.

(R.97-98).

The Appellants and Mr. Nielsen had several meetings and
conversations during the spring and summer of 1980.
However, the parties could not arrive at a mutual agreement.

(R.135-136).

During this same period, the Appellants did

make some unsuccessful effort to sell the remeining lots.
(R.128).
On December 8, 1980, the Appellants filed a Complaint
seeking the return of approximately $9,000.00 from Vantage.
On March 12, 1981, Vantage filed its Answer and Counterclaim
seeking a foreclosure of Appellants' interest in the four
(4) lots upon which there was still outstanding interest due
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization5provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Vantage.

On November 18, 1981, the Honorable Robert

Bullock, one of the Judges of the Fourth Judicial District
Court of Utah Ccunty, signed a Judgment dismissing
1\ppellants' Complaint and granting a Decree of Foreclosure
to Vantage.

On January 11, 1982, Notice of Appeal was filed

in this Court on behalf of the Appellants.

ARGUMENT

POINT I:

THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED THE STATUTE OF
FRAUDS.

This cc..ee presents an uncommon use of the Statute of
Frauds by the Appellants.

Traditionally, the Statute of

Frauds is used by a seller of real property as a defense
against a buyer who seeks epecific performance of the agreement to sell said real property.

However, in this case, it

is not the seller who is using the Statute of Frauds as a
"shield", but the buyers who are using the Statute as a
"sword".

Although such use of the Statute of Frauds is not

without legal precedence, it must be remembered that much
case law that interprets the Statute of Frauds is addressing
a different use of the Statute than is being proposed in
this case.
Appellants argue that the contract to purchase the
seven (7) lots from Vantage is unenforceable by reason of
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Utah's Statute of Fraud, U.C.A. §25-5-3 (1953 as amended).*
Because of this alleged unenforceability, Appellants claim
that they are entitled to restitution of moneys paid to
Vantage en four (4) of the seven (7) lots.

However, the

Trial Court held 1) that the Statute of Frauds was not applicable since there were sufficient writings and 2) that,
even if the Statute was applicable, there was sufficient
part performance to grant to the Court the equitab]e power
to enforce the contra.ct.

These two points will be dis-

cussed separately.

A.

Sufficient Memorandum

Whether or not a writing is sufficient to satisfy
the requirement of Utah's Statute of Frauds has been an
issue that this Court has addressed on numerous occasions.
An examination of this Court's opinion on this issue for the
last several years clearly

reve~ls

the desire of this Court

not to establish a bright-line test for determining whether
or not a writing is sufficient to satisfy the Statute.
In Birdzell v. Utah Oil Refining Co., 242 P.2d 578
(Utah, 1952), the Court reiterated the then traditional view
that

11

the memorandum which is relied upon. to satisfy the Statute

of Frauds must contain all the essential terms and

*Appellants, in their Brief, refer to U.C.A. § 25-5-1 (1953
as amended); however, since the subject matter of this case
is a contract for the sele of land, §25-5-3 is more
applicable. (Brief of Appellant, P.26).
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provisions of the Contract".
this holding has

be~n

242 P.2d at 580.

However,

greatly modified.

In Guinand v. Walton, 450 P.2d 467 (Utah, 1969),
the Defendants had sent a letter to the Plaintiff "to confirm" the Plaintiff's 10% ownership in certain partnership's assets which included real property.

The Plaintiff

later sued to receive his 10% and the Defendants raised the
defense of the Statute of Frauds.

This Court rejected the

defense of the Statute of Frauds holding that the wording of
U.C.A. §25-5-1 (1953 as amended) does not require that the
writing contain all the requirements of a complete contract.
Instead, the Court stated:
All that is required is that the interest
be granted or declared by a writing subscribed by the party to be charged. 450
P.2d at 469.
In the recent case of

Greg~rson

v. Jensen, 617 P.2d 369

(Utah, 1980), the buyer sued the sellers for specific
performance of a contract for the sale cf real property.
The Trial Court refused to grant specific performance since
there was not before it an adequate written description of
the subject real property.

Upon a motion for new trial, the

buyer produced the newly discovered evidence of an unsigned
deed which had the description of the property.

The Trial

Court refused to grant the new trial since the deed was unsigned.

This Court, in reversing the Trial Court's ruling,

held that several writings may be construed together in
order to satisfy the requirements of the Statute of Frauds.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In order for several writings to be construed together, som€
"nexus between the writings must be shown".

Further, parol

evidence may be used to demonstrate the nexus.

617 P.2d at

373.
The standard, established by this Court for determining whether or not there exists sufficient writings to
satisfy the requirements of the Statute of Frauds, dictate
to a Trial Court:

(1)

that it must review all the written

memorandum as a whole if eome nexus can be

sho~m

between the

writings, (2) that it must find that the party who is being
charged has signed, and (3) that it must find that the
wording in the writings is of the quality necessary for the
Trial Court to grant the relief requested.

In applying this

standard to the case at hand, the lower Court correctly held
that the Statute of Frauds had been satisfied and, thus, was
not applicable.

The writings in thjs case consist of three

(3) checks, a letter, and detailed ledgers.
these memora.nda reveal

signature~

The wording on

of both Appellants, legal

descriptions of the real property, the purchase price, the
amount of the down payment, and the interest rate.

The

writings were of such sufficiency that the lower Court could
not under the law have granted Appellants' requested relief,
restitution.

B.

Part Performance.

The Doctrine of Part Performance has been used by
courts of equity as a means to take a contract outside the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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traditionally hard-and-fast rules of the Statute of Frauds.
This doctrine has partially been codified in Utah as U.C.A.
§

25-5-8 (1953 as amended).

Although the lower Court in

this matter found sufficient writings to satisfy the requirements of the Statute of Frauds, it also found
sufficient part performance by the parties to take the contract outside the scope of the Statute.
The Appellants in their Brief advanced the following rationale as to why the Lower Court errored in its applications of the Doctrine of Part Performance:
1)

There were seven (7) separate contracts between the

parties; each contract was to purchase one lot;
2)

Therefore, performance by Vantage on three (3) of

the seven (7) contracts is not part performance on the part
of Vantage as to the remaining four (4) contrects; and,
3)

Finally, Vantage ca.nnot rely upon the payments made

by the Appellante a.s part performance.
However, this reasoning misinterprets the facts in this case
and the law of part performance.
First, Appellants have misapplied the facts by

ar~

guing in their brief that there was only one ccntract.
(Brief of Appellants, P.29).

As counsel for the Appellants

said during the trial, whether the parties in this case
entered into one contract covering seven (7) lots or seven
(7)

contracts each covering one lot is an issue of fact to

be decided by the Court.

(R.93).

The lower Court

implicitly found there to be only one contract and there is
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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substantial evidence of record to support such a findinE.
The agreement to buy the seven (7) lots was done at the same
time.

Payments on the seven (7) lots were done with one

check.

With the exception of the purchase price, all the

terms and conditions of sale, (both agreed and disputed
terms), were the same.

Finally, the Appellants themselves

thought of the transaction as one contract.

Appellant Carl

Baldwin testified at trial as to his meeting with Doug
Boulton as follows:
... After formally being introduced to Doug, we got
down to business and talked about some lots that
were being sold only to contractors. We then went
into discussion about what lots were available, the terms of a contract agreement. (F.83).
Thus, there is substantial evidence on the record to support
the finding that the parties had entered into one contact
for the purchase of seven (7) lots.
Seconci, the lower Court properly a.pp lied the laws of
the Doctrine of Part Performance to the facts in this ca.se.
As was mentioned above, it is usually the buyer of the real
property who invokes the Doctrine of Part Performar.ce.

In

those situations, the buyer is arguing that his actions were
of such character that it would violate the princjples of
equity not to enforce the contract.

In a situation in which

e seller seeks to invoke the Doctrine of Part Performance,
the Courts must be careful not to place the seller in the
position of neither being able to enforce the contract by
reason of the Statute of Frauds, nor deny the contract by
reason of the Doctrine of Part Performance.

Thus, if the

11 provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
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Doctrine would be available to buyer, it must also be
available to the seller!
This spirit of flexibility and fairness was announced
by this Court in Holmgrin Brothers, Inc. v. Ballard, 534
P.2d 611 (Utah, 1975), in which Chief Justice Maughan wrote:
The Doctrine of Part Performance, in the State of
Utah, has not been reduced to a formula, as it has
in some of our sister states. Thus, decisions of
this Court do not stay the hand of equity in the
·equitable situations created by oral contracts for
the transfer of ~n interest in land, but the
statute is preserved and remains to serve its
purpose - the prevention of fraud and injustice.
534 P.2d at 613-614.
The Trial Court in this case was faced with the following facts:

(1)

Both parties admit to the existence of a

contract to buy seven (7) lots; (2) The buyers paid a_10%
down payment on the seven (7) lots; (3) The buyers made
several interest payments on the lots; (4) The buyers sold
four of the lots and paid seller in full for three of the
lots; (5) Having been paid in full for three of the lots,
the seller·transferred its complete interest in those lots;
(6) The buyers made a profit in reselling three of the lots;
(7) The buyers attempted to sell the three remaining unsold
lots; and, (8) The contract between the parties was two and
a half years old before the buyers attempted to rescind it.
It is clear from these facts tha.t it would have been unjust
and tanarnount to fraud to invoke the Statute of Frauds in
this matter when both parties, over a substantial period of
time, relied upon and acted in accordance with their
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this matter when both parties, over a substantial period of
time, relied upon and acted in accordance with their
contractual relationship.

See Woolsey v. Brown, 539 P.2d

1035 (Utah, 1975).
Finally, Appellants argue that the mere payment of
money by a buyer is not sufficient to remove a contract for
the sale of real property from the Statute of Frauds.

The

Appellants are correctly stating this traditional rule.
Maxfield v. West, 23 P.754 (Utah, 1980).
Law Review 91 (1964).

See also 9 Utah

However, this traditional standard

has little application to the facts in this case.
above,

th~re

As stated

was only one contract and Vantage did more than

just accept Appellants' money.

Also, the Appellants

exercised dominion over the four (4) lots upon which they
are suing by selling one of lots and by trying to sell the
other three.

Thus, there was more than a "mere payment of

money".

The Trial Court correctly rejected Appellants' use of
the Statute of Frauds as a "sword" in this case.

The Court

recognized that there were sufficient writings to derrons tr ate unequivocBbly that there existed a contract to sell
seven (7) lots.

The Court also recognized that both parties

had acted in such a manner that the Doctrine of Part Performance would preclude either party from invoking the Statute
of Frauds.

The Appellants' use of the Statute of Frauds

should also be rejected by this Court since such a use is
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
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inconsistent with the principles of equity, and it is based
upon a misapplication of the facts in this case.

POINT II:

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT VANTAGE
DID NOT "GUARANTEE" CONSTRUCTION FINANCING.

The Appellants allege that one of the conditionf of the
contract to sell the seven lots was that Vantage uncon-·

ditionally "guaranteed" that Deseret Federal would provide
construction financing to the Appellants when they decided
to build houses en those lots.

The Appellants further

allege that, since Deseret Federal did not provide construetion financing, they are entitled to restitution of moneys
paid on four of the seven lots.
However, the Trial Court, upon hearing all the testimony and reviewing all the evidence found that the
Appellants failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Vantage had made such a "guarantee".

Thus, the

Trial Court rejects, as a matter of law, the four (4) legal
theories advanced by Appellants, e.g. breach of contract,
unjust enrichment, misrepresentation and fraud, and upon
which they claim they are entitled to restitution.
Although the Appellants discuss in their brief why the
legal theories they advanced at trial entitled them to
restitution, the thrust of their argument on appeal is that
the Trial Court erred when it entered its Findings of Fact
No. 11:

Plaintiffs contended that an officer of Vantage
Corporation had repre~ented to them at the time of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act,14
administered by the Utah State Library.
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purchase that at any time in the future they would
be guaranteed construction loan money to build on
any of the lots. Plaintiffs did not sustain their
burden of proof that any such guarantee was made
to them and it further appears the most convincing evidence is that no employee of Vantage
Corporation or its parent, Deseret Federal Savi~gs
and Loan· Association, had authority to bind the
Association to make a future loan.
Appellants advance two (2) main reasons for why said
finding is improper:

1) Vantage admitted to existence of

the "guarantee" in its Answer; and 2) the Trial Court improperly ignored the testimony of the Appellants.

These two

points, plus a review of the evidence present at triBl, will
be discussed below separately.

A.

Vantage's Answer.

Appellants maintain that, because Vantage admitted to
the existence of the guarantee in its Answer, the Trial
Court erred when it found that the guarantee had not been
made.

However, when the admission in the Answer is viewed

in light of how the case developed, the Trial Court was
within its discretion as to whether or not to hold such an
admission as conclusive.
Mr. Garrett, at trial, inforrred the Court that any admission to the guarantee was an error on his part since the
existence cf the guarantee was always at issue.

(R.210).

Mr. Harding, counsel for the Appellants, certainly ·knew well
in advance cf trial that the existence of the guarantee was
disputed.

The first action taken by the parties in this

matter after the pleadings had been filed was the Pre-Trial
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hearing held on May 22, 1981, before Judge Bullock.

At that

Pre-Trial, Joseph E. Hatch, counsel for Vantage, stated to
the Court that, "We allege that they made no promise to make
construction loans."

(R.215).

Mr. Harding later seemed to

recognize the disputed nature of this issue when he stated,
"It will be a factual issue, I guess, really."

(R.215).

Just prior to trial, the Appellants sent Interrogatories tp Vantage.

Interrogatory No. 6 read:

Did the Defendant or any of its officers or employees during discussion upon which the oral
contract is based or at anv other time state that
it would guarantee construction loans on said lots
for the Plaintiffs with Deseret Federal Savings
and Loan?
Vantage's Answer to In,terrogatory No. 6 was "No".

(R. 24).

Further,. Mr. Garrett in his opening statement at the trial
stated, "The evidence, your Honor, as to guarantee is going
to be sharply disputed."

(R.79).

Thus, there was no

question that the Appellants knew in advance cf trial and
throughout the litigation that Vantage did not "admit" to
the existence of the guarantee.

The record in this matter

reveals the extensive amount of time that was spent on the
issue of the guarantee by both parties.

It is apparent that

the Appellants did not rely on the "admission" in the
Answer.
Finally, paragraph 2 of the Fourth Cause of Action of
Appellants' Amended Complaint reads:
That immediately prior to said sale Defendant
represented to the Pld.ntiffs that it would
guarantee construction loans with Deseret Federal
Savings 2.nd Loan Association.
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16 provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Vantage denied this paragraph in its Answer and it, of
course, goes to the same facts.

Thus, the tenor of the

Answer was to deny the existence of the guarantee.
However, the Appellants argue that the "admission" is
conclusive and final.

This simply is not the law.

admission is a judicial admission.
evidenciary admission.

Such an

It is not necessarily an

Thus, the trier of fact has the dis-

cretion to pla.ce as much weight as he feels is appropriate.
See Heth v. Del Webb's Hi.ghwav Inn, 429 P.2d 442 (Ariz.,
1967).

In determining how much weight should be plci.ced upon
such an admission, the Trial Court could certainly take into
account the fact that Vantage denied the existence at every
opportunity subsequent to the filing of the Answer and that
the Appellants never raised the fact of the admission in the
pleading until closing arguments.

Thus, the Trial Court was

within its discretion in holding such an admission was not
conclusive as to the issue of the existence of the
guarantee.

B.

Testimony of Appellants.

Appellants also argue that the Trial Court abused its
discretion when it found that the "guarantee" was not made
because such a finding contradicts the direct testimony of
the two Appellants.

However, this was not an abuse of the

Trial Court's discretion.

17
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In DeVas v. Noble, 369 P.2d 290 (Utah, 1962), the Court
affirmed the Trial Court's ruling in favor of the Defendant
despite the uncontradicted direct testimony of the Plaintiff.

In affirming the Lower Court, Justice Crockett wrote:
Due to his function as the determiner of the facts
and his advantaged position in close proximity to
the witnesses and the trial, it is his privilege
to be the exclusive judge of the credibility of
the witnesses, the weight to be given the evidence
and the facts to be found therefrom. This
includes appraisal of the ability of the witnesses
to know and understand and their capc_city to remember. The court's prerogative of course does
not go so far as to permit him to stubbornly
ignore and refuse to be guided by credible, uncontradicted evidence when all reasonable minds
would accept it. That could result in arbitrary
and unreasoning denial or distortion of justice.
Nevertheless because of the prerogative just
mentioned as judge of all aspects of the case, if
the testimony of a witness is affected with any
frailty which might reasonably be considered as
casting suspicion upon it or discrediting its
accuracy or truthfulness, the court is not bound
to accept such testimony as the fact and so find.
And the rule is not otherwise because the witness
happened to be a party to the action. 369 P.2d at
293.

Th~

above position was reaffirmed by this Court in Anderson

v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, 583 P.2d 101 (Utah,
1978), when it stated:
The testimony of a party or other interested
witness is not conclusive, even if it is not
contradicted, as here. His testimony is to be
given such weight and credibility as the trier of
fact finds reasonable under the circumstances.
583 P.2d at 104.
The Appellants argument in this regard relies heavily
upon the case of McClellan v. David, 439 P.2d 673 (Nev.,
1968).

However, that case involves some extremely unusual

facts.

A Nevada trial Court set aside a default judgment in
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favor of Plaintiff.

The Plaintiff appealed alleging that

the lower Court had abused its discretion in setting aside
the judgment.

The Supreme Court of Nevada agreed, holding

that the only reason the lower Court could set aside the
judgment is if it disregarded the testimony of a Mrs.
Troxel, an interested witness.

Not only is this case

controversial, as the excellent descenting opinion points
out, but :Lt is dea.1 ing with such a. completely different set
of circumstances that it is of little value.
The Trial Court, as the trier of fact, was within its
discretion when it entered a finding that was contrary to
the testimony of two interest witnesses.

Thus, this Court

should affirm that finding.

C.

The Evidence Supporting the Lower Court's Finding.

The Appellants seem to be arguing that as a matter of
law they are entitled to restitution since the Appellants
testified that the "guarantee" was made by Mr. Boulton,
Vantage admitted inadvertently in its Answer that guarantee
existed, and Mr. Boulton could not remember his conversation with the Appellants.

However, such an argument ignores

the large amount of evidence that indicates that no "guarantee" was made.
First, it was almost two years a.fter the parties had
entered into the contract when the Appellants first
approached Deseret Federal about obtaining construction f i-

19
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nancing on any of the lots.

Also, during that two year

period, the Appellants sold four of the seven lots.

Three

of those lots were sold at a profit to the Appellants.

This

is certainly evidence of the fact that the "guarantee" did
not exist.

Also, it is evidence that the Appellants'

dealings in this matter is inconsistent with the "existence"
of a guarantee.

Such behavior is a waiver by the Appellants

of the "guarantee" even if it existed.

See Larsen v.

Knight, 233 P.2d 365 (Utah, 1951), and Hoke v.
Stevens-Norton, Inc., 375 P.2d 743 (Wash., 1962).
Second, Mr. Boulton testified that although he could
not clearly remember his conversations with the Appellants,
it would be contrary to his training and experience to make
such a guarantee.

(R.159).

This is evidence to support the

Trial Court's finding that the guarantee was not made.
Third, Mr. Preben Nielsen, the Executive Vice President
and Manager of Vantage, testified that Vantage had no
authority to bind Deseret Federal to make loans, that no one
at Deseret Federal had authority to commit Deseret Federal
to make construction loans in the future, and the Doug
Boulton did not have the authority to commit Deseret Federal
to make loans in the future.

(R.189-190).

The lack of au-

thority to make such a ' 1 guarantee" is certainly evidence
that the Trial Court can consider in finding that no such
guarantee was made.
Thus, the Trial Court did not arbitrarily disregard the
testimony of the Appellants.

There is substantici_l evidence.
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to support a Court's finding that no guarantee was made; and
there is considerable reasons to support the Court's conclusion that Appellants failed to meet their burden of proof
by the preponderance of the evidence.

Finally, the Appellants argue that this Court has the
duty to review and to weight all the evidence in this case.
However, the two cases cited by the Appellants in support of
this view demonstrate that this Court does not have total
discretion in reviewing the facts.

In Del Porto v. Nicolo,

495 P.2d 811 (Utah, 1972), this Ccu/rt held:
It is true, as plaintiff asserts, that this action
to avoid deeds is one in equity upon which this
court has both the prerogative and the duty to
review and weight the evidence, and to determine
the facts. However, in the practical application
of that rule it is well established in our decisional law that due to the advantaged position of
the trial court, in close proximity to the parties
and the witnesses, there is indulged a presumption
of correctness of his findings and judgment, with
the burden upon the appellant to show they were in
error; and where the evidence is in conflict, we
do not upset his findings merely because we have
reviewed the matter differently, but do so only if
evidence clearly preponderates against them. 495
P.2d at 812..
In the case of Hatch v. Bastian, 567 P.2d 1100 (Utah,
1977), the Plaintiff brought an action for either rescission or reformation of a deed because of an alleged mutual
mistake of the parties.

Judge Bullock ruled in favor of the

Defendant because he found the evidence did not support the
fact that there had been a mutual mistake.

This Court af-

firmec Judge Bullock's decision and held as follows:
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Even though we may review the evidence, the proposition is well grounded in our law that due to
the advantaged position of the trial court, we
indulge considerable deference to his findings and
do not interfere with them unless the evidence so
clearly preponderates against them that this court
is convinced that a manifest iniustice has been
done.· On the basis of what has.been said above
concerning the dispute i.n the evidence and the
burdens of proof, we are not persuaded that the
findings and judgment should be overturned. 567
P.2d at 1102.
As has been discussed above, the Appellants have failed to
meet their burden on appeal and show that the Trial Court
erred in finding that Vantage had not made the alleged
guarantee.

CONCLUSION
For reasons stated above, .Respondent respectfully
requests this Court to affirm the trial Court's judgment.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 4th day of May, 1982.
GARRETT AND STURDY

By

~~~.. Hatch
~L Hi~

Jo~eph

Attorney for Respondent
311 South State Street
Suite 320
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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Esq., HARDING AND HARDING, Attorney for Appellants, 58 South
Hain Street, P. 0. Box 532, Pleasant Grove, Utah

84062.
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